Beyond Observation and Feedback: Integrating Behavioural safety trainingal Safety Principles Into

Other Safety Management Systems1.

Sherry R. Perdue

Abstract

A behavioural safety trainingal observation and feedback process is a very effective means of reducing injuries and incidents

in the workplace. By observing and providing feedback, peers encourage safe rather than at-risk work

practices of one another. In addition, the data collected provides a leading metric predictive of downstream

safety performance. However, a behavioural safety trainingal observation and feedback process is just one tool that utilizes

principles of psychology to encourage an improved safety culture. In fact, in absence of a positive (or

improving) safety culture, an observation and feedback process is likely to meet limited success.

Traditional safety management systems and activities (e.g., incident and near miss reporting, incident

investigations, safety meetings, safety committees, safety accountability processes, safety reward and

recognition programs) may undermine safety culture change efforts. Systems which are ineffective or

counterproductive should be carefully examined and modified.

This paper provides a review of a behavioural safety trainingal observation and feedback process and discusses the tool’s

broader purpose of influencing an organization’s safety culture. Next, the paper reviews some of the

principles from the field of psychology which underlie the observation process and illustrates, through case

study, how these principles should also influence the design of other safety management systems. Finally,

the paper will present a strategy for assessing and modifying traditional safety systems so that they support

an organization’s safety culture change efforts.

Behavioural safety trainingal Observation and Feedback Reviewed

A behavioural safety trainingal observation and feedback process is a tool designed to help encourage safe work practices and

discourage at-risk work practices. Using simple but effective observation techniques, employees

periodically observe each other. Following the brief observation period, the observer gives tactful one-onone feedback regarding safe and at-risk behavioural safety trainings observed. This one-on-one feedback itself can be

instrumental in changing at-risk work practices. In some cases, the feedback provides information to the

individual, pointing out a risky behavioural safety training he or she was unintentionally performing. In other cases, the

feedback provides social support to encourage peers to take the time and make the effort to perform the

behavioural safety training safely.

In many cases, however, feedback alone is not sufficient to address the at-risk behavioural safety training. Often, at-risk

behavioural safety trainings are encouraged or even required by the work environment. For example, improper lifting

practices may be necessary because of the layout of a particular workstation.

1. In Proceedings of the 39th ASSE Annual Professional Development Conference and Exposition,

American Association of Safety Engineers, 2000.

Using a metal ladder for electrical work may be encouraged if fiberglass ladders are needlessly

inconvenient to get. In these cases, changes to the workplace should be made to increase the likelihood of

safe work practices occurring. Therefore, the next step of the observation process is for the observer and

observee to analyze the work situation to determine the contributing causes of any at-risk behavioural safety trainings and

determine improvement opportunities.

In addition to the one-on-one discussion, the data from an entire group’s observations are periodically

collected and compiled. The compiled data is shared with the employees as a second form of feedback,

illustrating the areas in which the team is excelling and those which provide the greatest potential for

injury. Again, however, feedback alone may be insufficient to encourage behavioural safety training change. Where the

compiled data reveal frequent, repeated occurrence of a particular at-risk behavioural safety training, there are likely system-level influences effecting the behavioural safety training. These areas are analyzed in detail by the work team, which then

develops relevant intervention strategies to reduce the likelihood of the at-risk behavioural safety trainings reoccurring. For

example, if the at-risk behavioural safety training of failing to use a mechanical hoist is observed repeatedly, the work team

would investigate why the behavioural safety training occurs and introduce appropriate change(s). Perhaps the only hoist

available in the area is in constant use, in which case the purchase of a second hoist may be justified.

A Total Safety Culture Defined

While the immediate goal of a behavioural safety trainingal observation and feedback process is to identify and increase

critical safety-related behavioural safety trainings, the ultimate goal of the process is much greater. A behavioural safety trainingal observation

and feedback process is a key tool to influence an organization’s overall safety culture. By providing a

structured approach to encourage systematic peer observation and feedback, the likelihood that such

feedback and problem solving will begin to occur more frequently on an informal basis is increased. This

frequent informal communication between coworkers about safety is a key characteristic of a Total Safety

Culture.

A Total Safety Culture is defined as a culture in which individuals: (a) hold safety as a value; (b) feel a

sense of responsibility for the safety of their coworkers as well as themselves; and (c) are willing and able

to ACT on the sense of responsibility they feel. That is, individuals have the skills and tools necessary and

are supported by the culture to go “beyond the call of duty” on behalf of the safety of themselves and

others. In workshops conducted within dozens of organizations across the country, participants were asked

to list specific components of a Total Safety Culture. Common responses include:

• All employees comply with safety rules and regulations at all times.

• Employees continuously search for safety hazards and take initiative themselves to correct hazards

when found.

• Employees are eager to participate in safety-related activities. Participation in safety-related activities

is promoted and encouraged through respect and positive recognition.

• All safety-related issues are openly communicated. Fear of reprimand or discipline does not inhibit

discussions.

• Safety incidents are viewed as an opportunity to identify system failures and therefore improve the

system. Individuals are not assumed to be, and are rarely found to be, at fault.

• Training systems result in all employees having the needed knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform

their jobs safely.

• All employees fully understand and appreciate the potential hazards of the operations performed.

• Employees do not consider taking unnecessary risks.

• Management never (knowingly or otherwise) encourages employees to take unnecessary risks.

• Regular safety-related feedback is a way of life. Corrective feedback is constructive and appreciated.

• Peer pressure acts toward, rather than against safety.

• All business activities are managed with a constant focus on accident prevention and occupational

health.

Principles of Psychology Which Underlie an Observation and Feedback Process

If designed and implemented carefully, an observation and feedback process is a key tool to help drive

change in an organization’s safety culture. When done right, it is built upon principles from psychological

research. These behavioural safety trainingal science principles, fifty of which are compiled and reviewed in Geller, 1996,

include concepts such as:

• Behavioural safety training is directed by activators and motivated by consequences.

• People are motivated to maximize positive consequences and minimize negative consequences.

• Feedback can be a powerful consequence.

• Although negative consequences can lead to behavioural safety training change, they may have undesirable side effects.

• People compensate for increases in perceived safety by taking more risks. • People view behavioural safety training as correct and appropriate to the degree they see others doing it.

• Long-term behavioural safety training change requires people to change “inside” as well as “outside”.

• When people feel empowered, their safe behavioural safety training spreads to other situations and behavioural safety trainings.

• People feel more personal control when working to achieve success than when working to avoid

failure.

• Choice increases commitment, ownership, and involvement.

The observation process cannot, however, succeed on its own in changing an

organization’s culture, no matter how well it is designed, implemented, and executed.

Other safety management systems as well as individual management practices must also

support the desired culture. In fact, in the absence of a positive (or changing) safety

culture, an observation and feedback process is likely to meet limited success.

Application of Principles of Psychology to Other Safety Management Systems

Organizations rely on a number of processes and procedures to manage risk and thereby

decrease the chance of incidents and injuries. These generally include systems such as

safety rules and procedures, safety training, hazard identification and correction,

discipline, incident reporting and investigation, safety communications, safety

suggestions, and rewards and recognition. Each safety management system has an

important contribution to make in terms of not only improving workplace safety, but also

influencing an organization’s safety culture. At best, when the system is poorly designed

or operating ineffectively, its ability to accomplish its primary purpose will be

compromised. At worst, a poorly designed, badly implemented, or ill-functioning system

can also have a destructive influence on an organization’s overall safety culture. For

example, when incident investigations create an air of mistrust and fault-finding, safety

incentive programs discourage injury reporting, accountability processes fail to recognize

individuals for their accomplishments, and performance evaluations only consider safety

performance to be whether the individual was involved in an incident or not, the culture

cannot advance.

To compound the situation further, the systems are interactive and, in many cases, overlap. For example,

hazard identification and correction requires a climate that fosters employee participation, sufficient

training so employees can recognize and correct hazards, and ample communication of the hazard and/or its

solution. Therefore, poor features of one system can have negative influences on other systems. For

example, when employee incentive programs and/or supervisor performance evaluations are based

primarily on injury rates, it is unreasonable to expect those employees to embrace an open injury reporting

and investigation system. Or when the incident investigation process is viewed as extremely blameoriented, it is not reasonable to expect employees to feel comfortable having their safe and at-risk behavioural safety trainings

observed and recorded. Consider the following example. An Illustrative Case Study

45

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Very Somewhat Neither Somewhat Very

Non-Hourly who have been involved in incident investigations

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Very Somewhat Neither Somewhat Very

Percent Agreement

Hourly who have been involved in incident investigations

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Percent Agreement

Very Somewhat Neither Somewhat Very

Hourly who have NOT been involved in incident investigations

Blame… Problem Solving…

Despite a long standing, fairly structured protocol

for investigating employee safety and process

safety-related incidents, the management team of

a mid-sized chemical manufacturing plant was

concerned that the investigations were not very

effective. In particular, when the incidents

involved some form of human behavioural safety training (which of

course most did) the analysis nearly always

stopped at identifying the contributing behavioural safety training,

failing to explain why the behavioural safety training had occurred.

Figure 1. Sample survey results

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Percent Agreement

Very Somewhat Neither Somewhat Very

Non-Hourly who have been involved in incident investigations

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Percent Agreement

Very Somewhat Neither Somewhat Very

Hourly who have been involved in incident investigations

Hourly who have NOT been involved in incident investigations

50

Wrong Findings… Correct Findings…

As part of an overall effort to improve the

company’s investigation process which would

include process redesign and training, an attempt

was first made to better understand the

employee’s perceptions of the existing

investigation process. A random sample of

employees were asked to complete a

questionnaire describing their experience in the

reporting and investigation of incidents. The

questionnaire focused on three areas. First, a

series of questions addressed the individual’s

history of reporting near misses, minor incidents,

and major incidents. For those indicating that

they had ever elected to not report an incident (or

would consider not doing so), they were asked to

indicate the reasons why. Next, the questionnaire

asked their history of participating in incident

investigations. Finally, the questionnaire included

several items asking their opinion of the

investigation process. The questionnaire was

anonymous and was administered and collected in

a manner that ensured their confidentiality.

45

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Percent Agreement

Very Somewhat Neither Somewhat Very The results of the analysis revealed some

interesting information. Of all employees

surveyed (both hourly and salaried), 60%

indicated they would not report an incident if they

could avoid doing so. Sixty percent suggested

they would likely not report an incident because

“they or someone else would be blamed”, while

40% feared that discipline would result.

Interestingly, company records showed very few

instances of the use of the disciplinary procedures.

Figure 2: Sample survey results

In examining employees’ opinions of the existing

investigation process, the survey responses were

separated by position (hourly and salaried) and by

whether individuals had or had not been involved

in an incident investigation within the previous 12

months. The results for two of the questionnaire

items are shown in Figures 1 and 2. As

illustrated, the salaried employees responded

fairly positively. Most felt the investigations were of a “fact-finding” nature and resulted in accurate conclusions. The hourly respondents’ perceptions were not as favorable. Those who had been involved in

an investigation had somewhat mixed opinions, with some holding fairly strong negative opinions, but

most being neutral. On the other hand, those who had not recently had the experience of being involved in

an investigation rated the investigations quite negatively. Unfortunately however, this group accounted for

most of the hourly respondents and is representative of a large majority of the plant population. Although

not ideal, it’s apparently not as bad as the rumor mill has it painted. So, although participation in the

process enhances most people’s opinion of it, the pervading opinion is overwhelmingly negative. Followup focus groups confirm these opinions. Overall perceptions of the investigation process is probably best

summarized by the nickname given it: Kangaroo Court.

Not only was the existing investigation process failing to provide the organization with information to

allow them to make true improvements and therefore minimize the possibility for similar events to be

repeated, it also had an extremely destructive influence on the organization’s culture. As a result, not only

were people hiding incidents whenever they could manage to do so, they were also guarded in providing

information to the investigation team whenever an event was reported and investigated. As a result, the

investigation was carried out with less than adequate information, likely resulting in poor conclusions,

further enhancing people’s negative perceptions of the process, resulting in a spiraling situation likely to

continue to get worse.

Interestingly, this same organization had attempted several years before, to introduce a

peer observation and feedback process. After having designed the details of the process

and trained a pilot group of employees, the safety coordinators were surprised and

disappointed to see extremely low participation rates within the pilot group. The

employees did not seem interested in participating in this safety improvement process.

Although the employees were assured the process was anonymous and the data would be

confidential, they were still reluctant to observe and record the safety-related behavioural safety trainings of

their coworkers. Wonder why?

An Assessment Tool To Evaluate Safety Management Systems

The same principles of psychology which underlie the behavioural safety trainingal observation and feedback process are

equally applicable for creating other safety management systems which motivate and reinforce safe work

practices and create a culture which promotes true interdependency for safety. Therefore, the central

themes of a Total Safety Culture should serve as a ruler against which to measure and improve all

organizational safety management systems so that they are effective not only in their primary missions, but

also have a positive influence on the organization’s safety culture.

To help organizations assess and redesign existing safety management systems based on principles of a

Total Safety Culture, an assessment tool comprised of a set of “Maturity Paths” (one for each of several

common safety management systems) was developed. Each Maturity Path lists between 10-20 key

components of the system to be evaluated. Each component is evaluated on a four-point scale (i.e.,

Beginning, Improving, Achieving, Leading), with each level describing a stage in the evolution of that

particular safety management system, with Beginning indicating the component is nonexistent or poorly

designed and Leading indicating the component is “cutting edge”. Again, the tool is not intended to be a

thorough evaluation of the system’s effectiveness at accomplishing its primary mission, but rather to assess

its influence on the organization’s safety culture as it operates. An example of a portion of one of the

Maturity Paths is shown in Table 1. Maturity Path for Incident Reporting & Analysis

Beginning (1) Leading (4)

1.All but the most serious incidents go

unreported.

1 2 3 4 All incidents (e.g., near misses,

property damage, injuries) are reported

in a timely fashion.

5.Analyses are conducted by safety

professionals and/or supervisors only.

1 2 3 4 An incident analysis team is composed

of members representing a cross-section

of the organization and includes

individuals involved in the event.

7.No training is provided for incident

reporting and analysis.

1 2 3 4 All employees receive training in the

philosophy and process of investigating

incidents. Investigation team leaders

receive detailed training in investigation

skills such as interviewing and root

cause analysis.

9.Analyses often result in identifying

“who’s to blame.” Corrective measures

such as discipline or “counseling” are

common.

1 2 3 4 Incident analyses focus on determining

system-level root causes and

minimizing or eliminating them.

Individuals are not assumed to be at

fault. Appropriate behavioural safety training-based

corrective actions are introduced where

warranted.

10.Corrective actions and follow-up

activities are handled by the safety

department only.

1 2 3 4 Corrective actions and follow-up

activities are handled by appropriate

personnel (e.g., safety department,

safety committee, area personnel).

14.Feedback concerning investigation

results and corrective action

implementation is haphazard.

1 2 3 4 Feedback concerning investigation

results and corrective action

implementation occurs without fail with

all stakeholders.

16.Employees characterize the incident

reporting and analysis systems as

unsystematic, fault-finding, and/or

ineffective.

1 2 3 4 Employees have confidence in the

incident reporting and analysis systems

to reduce the chance of future incidents.

Table 1: This table illustrates a portion of the Maturity Path for Incident Analysis

Processes.

Naturally, because the purpose is to assess the impact of the system on organizational culture, many of the

components evaluated have to do with employee perceptions. Therefore, additional data is generally

needed during the assessment to accurately rate system components. Survey data (e.g., from a

comprehensive culture survey or safety-specific survey) and focus group results are ideal inputs.

The assessment can be completed in a variety of ways, but is most effective when

representatives from throughout the entire organization participate. The use of experts

from outside the organization to facilitate the evaluation may be useful. The assessment

can be completed by a single team or through the compilation of several teams’ results. The results of the assessment readily reveal areas in which modifications are needed and provide direction

for doing so. When planning system modifications, it is important to remember this assessment focuses on

employee perceptions, not necessarily reality. That is, the results indicate how employees feel incident

investigations are being handled, not necessarily how the actual process works. Similarly, items on the

Maturity Path for discipline primarily measure what employees perceive as common practice. Perhaps only

one incident in one hundred results in an employee being formally disciplined. But if that event is what

employees remember, discipline may be viewed as the norm. Further complicating this scenario is the fact

that perceptions often lag reality. Therefore, recent changes to any management system may not be

reflected employees’ current perceptions.

So, when considering modifications to any system, two primary options for action should be considered.

First, look at the actual process. For example, safety training concerns may be caused by a variety of

issues, each with different solutions. Safety training may be too short, too complicated, too boring, or too

general for application on the job. Training may be given by employees who lack credibility, or may be

conducted on overtime either for the trainee or his counterpart back on the job. Alternatively, the training

itself may be top notch, but treated by the employee’s supervisor as a nuisance or as secondary to “getting

the work done.” Therefore, it is also important to consider how perceptions of the system are being

managed (or not managed).

Consider another example. A safety suggestion process will likely be seen as beneficial

only by those whose suggestions have been implemented, and perhaps by those who have

at least received feedback to their input. Suggestions might be actively solicited, fairly

evaluated by a cross-functional team of employees, amply funded, and quickly acted

upon, but if they’re poorly communicated to the rest of the workforce, employees may

perceive the system as being useless. Worse still, they may view the system as an

indication of management’s lack of appreciation for their input and low concern for

safety. Here, the situation can be addressed easily without revamping the entire safety

suggestion program, just the communications aspects.

Conclusions

A behavioural safety trainingal observation and feedback process is not only an effective means of reducing

workplace injuries, it can be instrumental in driving change in an organization’s safety

culture. But, other safety management systems also influence an organization’s safety

culture, and that influence may be either positive or negative. This paper has presented a

tool used to help apply the same psychological principles that underlie a behavioural safety trainingal

observation and feedback process to these other systems so that every system is working

together to support an organization’s drive toward a Total Safety Culture.

References

Geller, E. Scott. The Psychology of Safety: How to Improve Behavioural safety trainings and Attitudes on the Job. Radnor,

PA: Chilton Book Co, 1996.

SPE 74067

Behavioural safety training-Based Safety: The Next Step in Injury Prevention

Michael R. Gilmore and Sherry R. Perdue, Safety Performance Solutions Inc., and Peter Wu, KLAP & Partners Consultant

Private Limited

Copyright 2001, Society of Petroleum Engineers Inc.

This paper was prepared for presentation at the SPE International Conference on

Health, Safety & Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production held in Kuala

Lumpur, Malaysia, 20-22 March, 2002.

This paper was selected for presentation by an SPE Program Committee following

review of information contained in an abstract submitted by the author(s). Contents of

the paper, as presented, have not been reviewed by the Society of Petroleum Engineers

and are subject to correction by the author(s). The material, as presented, does not

necessarily reflect any position of the Society of Petroleum Engineers, its officers, or

members. Papers presented at SPE meetings are subject to publication review by

Editorial Committees of the Society of Petroleum Engineers. Electronic reproduction,

distribution, or storage of any part of this paper for commercial purposes without the

written consent of the Society of Petroleum Engineers is prohibited. Permission to

reproduce in print is restricted to an abstract of not more than 300 words; illustrations

may not be copied. The abstract must contain conspicuous acknowledgment of where

and by whom the paper was presented. Write Librarian, SPE, P.O. Box 833836,

Richardson, TX 75083-3836, U.S.A., fax 01-972-952-9435.

Introduction

Historically, organizations have focused on improving safety

by addressing the work environment surrounding employees.

Providing hazard-free facilities and providing better tools and

equipment have, understandably, worked well to improve

safety. But many organizations have reached a plateau;

continuing to rely solely on these approaches will produce

only marginal gains. Despite having a workplace ‘designed’

to reduce hazards, incidents and injuries still occur with

alarming regularity. We have come to realize (or be reminded)

that 1) people are not perfect and will make mistakes despite

their best intentions and working in the best of surroundings,

and 2) the work culture often allows or encourages at-risk

behavioural safety trainings to be performed. In the last decades of the 20th

century, the behavioural safety trainingal approach to safety performance

improvement was developed to focus on reducing hazards by

understanding employee behavioural safety trainings in the context of their work

culture.

Behavioural safety training-based safety (BBS) refers to a broad category of

interventions (e.g., processes, programs, strategies, tactics) in

which behavioural safety trainingal psychology principles are applied to change

specific behavioural safety trainings. BBS principles have been used, often in

the form of a behavioural safety trainingal observation and feedback process,

with considerable success to reduce the occurrence of

incidents and injuries, primarily by increasing the frequency of

safe behavioural safety trainings and decreasing the number of at-risk behavioural safety trainings.

The techniques used are analogous to those used in the field of

“performance management”, where behavioural safety trainings that increase

production and/or improve quality are identified and increased

with the application of behavioural safety trainingal interventions.

However, as effective as behavioural safety training-based approaches can

be, a true step change in safety performance will require more

that simply ensuring that individuals perform their own jobs

safely. It will also require that individuals work together,

going “beyond the call of duty” for the safety of one another.

That is, people must Actively Care for the safety of their

coworkers by performing behavioural safety trainings which directly or

indirectly influence the safety of others. Actively caring may

be demonstrated through a variety of behavioural safety trainings such as

offering to assist a coworker lift a heavy load, performing

housekeeping duties beyond personal territories, participating

in formal safety improvement activities, or performing

informal activities like cautioning a coworker about a

potentially risky behavioural safety training, or recognizing coworkers for their

safe work practices.

Therefore, it is critical that behavioural safety trainingal change

interventions be introduced in a way that will have a positive

impact on the organization’s overall safety culture. In fact,

well designed and implemented behavioural safety trainingal safety processes

can help move the organization toward the achievement of a

Total Safety Culture. A Total Safety Culture is defined as a

culture in which individuals: (a) hold safety as a value; (b) feel

a sense of responsibility for the safety of their coworkers as

well as themselves; and (c) are willing and able to ‘go beyond

the call of duty’ for the safety of others. That is, individuals

have the skills and tools necessary and are supported by the

culture to intervene on behalf of the safety of others.

To understand how to influence safety-related behavioural safety trainings,

and to do so in a way that will positively influence the

organization’s safety culture, let’s first consider why at-risk

behavioural safety trainings occur.

Behavioural safety training is the Common Denominator

No matter how safely work places are designed, how

thoroughly employees are trained, or how stringently

compliance is enforced, organizations must still deal with the

uncertainty of human behavioural safety training. Even if we assume perfect 2 M.R. GILMORE, S. R. PERDUE, AND P. WU SPE 74067

compliance, good intentions, and a clear understanding of the

job-related risks (and these are bold assumptions), people will

make mistakes. It’s simply a matter of when, not if. This

expectation should guide our approach to managing risks and

improving safety performance.

In fact, the National Safety Council has estimated that the

vast majority of incidents and injuries share at-risk behavioural safety training as

a common denominator; that is, the victims (or coworkers)

performed an at-risk behavioural safety training that led to the incidents/injuries.

This finding is not intended to blame employees, but to focus

the analysis of the incident. Organizations should be

investigating what encouraged or allowed the employee to

perform the at-risk behavioural safety training. The answer to that question will

lead to the real root causes and long-term solutions.

ABCs of Behavioural safety training. Behavioural safety training is influenced by two distinct

factors: activators and consequences. Activators precede

behavioural safety training and serve to guide, prompt, direct, or catalyze a

behavioural safety training. That is, activators tell us what we should be doing.

While driving, roadway signs instruct the driver to comply

with the speed limit, come to complete stops, and yield to

oncoming traffic. However, other activators influence the

driver to take shortcuts: being late for an important meeting, or

seeing others exceed the posted speed limit. Faced with these

competing activators, what behavioural safety training will be performed? The

answer comes by examining the consequences the driver

expects to gain or avoid.

As with activators, there are typically consequences

which both encourage and discourage the at-risk behavioural safety training.

Let’s examine the potential consequences of speeding. One

potential negative consequence of speeding is to receive a

speeding ticket. On the other hand, the time saved by speeding

is a potential positive consequence. Which of these two

consequences is more powerful? While receiving a ticket is a

very aversive consequence, drivers realize that the likelihood

of actually receiving one is quite low, based on their own and

others’ experience. Saving time, however, is virtually certain.

As a result, the potential time savings tends to be a more

powerful consequence than the possibility of receiving a

speeding ticket.

In the example above, the probability of the expected

consequence greatly influences the behavioural safety training. However, most

situations are not quite that simple. In addition to probability,

we must also consider the timing and significance of the

consequence. Consequences that occur sooner rather than later

tend to be more influential, and consequences that are

personally significant are more motivating than those that are

insignificant. In the speeding example, the driver expects to

save time, s/he will save time immediately, and the time

saved, even if just a few minutes, is often significant. If the

driver were caught by the police, s/he would receive the ticket

immediately, and it would be significant, but because s/he

doesn’t expect that to occur, he or she isn’t concerned about

the timing or the significance of the ticket.

Daily, employees are faced with similar decisions to

perform safe or at-risk behavioural safety trainings. Understanding the activators

and consequences motivating someone to take a risk does not

imply the behavioural safety training is acceptable. But understanding why a

risky behavioural safety training occurs can help design effective interventions.

That is, tools and strategies based on principles of behavioural safety trainingal

psychology can facilitate a more thorough analysis of the

situation, help determine the root causes for the at-risk

behavioural safety training, and therefore guide the implementation of

interventions to encourage employees perform the behavioural safety training

safely.

But that is only part of the story. It is also important to

consider the internal person factors that influence behavioural safety training.

Behavioural safety training-based psychology provides the tools and the

techniques to target safety-related behavioural safety training, while personbased psychology helps to create the desire and the passion

that will be needed to help a behavioural safety training-based process succeed.

The understanding of both are necessary in order for a

behavioural safety training-change processes to truly help achieve a Total Safety

Culture.

Person-Based Psychology and BBS

When individuals feel good about themselves, their work

teams, and the organization as a whole, they are more likely to

go out of their way to assist others (i.e., to Actively Care).

Certain person factors (i.e., expectancies or mood states)

influence people’s safety-related behavioural safety trainings and their

willingness to intervene on behalf of another’s safety. In

particular, five person factors have been shown to predict

Actively Caring behavioural safety training: self-esteem, self-effectiveness

(known in the research literature as self-efficacy), personal

control, optimism, and belonging.

Research shows that people often possess the right values

and intentions for safety. The problem occurs when they are

faced with the opportunity to act on those values and intentions.

Consider the typical response pattern (shown in Figure 1) to a

set of questions contained in a survey frequently used by the

authors to assess an organization’s safety culture. The graph

show the average percent agreement with the following

statements:

• Employees should caution a coworker if they see them

performing an at-risk behavioural safety training.

• I would be willing to caution a coworker if I see them

performing an at-risk behavioural safety training.

• I often caution coworkers when I see them performing

at-risk behavioural safety trainings.

As shown, most people respond favorably to the first two

statements, indicating most have the necessary values and

intentions. But far fewer respondents agree with the final

statement, indicating there are personal and organizational

barriers to this critical behavioural safety training. The barriers are numerous SPE 74067 BEHAVIOURAL SAFETY TRAINING-BASED SAFETY: THE NEXT STEP IN INJURY PREVENTION 3

Figure 2. Employees use a behavioural safety trainingal checklist as they

observe and give feedback to one another

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Values

(Should)

Intentions

(Willing)

Behavioural safety trainings

(Do)

Percent Agreement

Figure 1. Responses vary when asked whether one

‘should’, ‘is willing’, and ‘does’ actively care for others.

(e.g., not my job, I’ll get a negative reaction, don’t know how

to give tactful feedback, don’t know the job he’s doing so I

can’t give feedback, people here don’t interact with each other

in that way), but in all cases, these barriers can be minimized

by increasing employees’ person-factors (e.g., self-esteem,

belonging, and empowerment).

Designing, implementing, evaluating, and sustaining a

behavioural safety training-based observation and feedback process can help

employees feel more engaged in, and possess greater ownership

over safety. When organizations design and implement

behavioural safety trainingal safety initiatives, they should do so in a way that

increases these necessary person factors.

Behavioural safety trainingal Observation and Feedback

One of the most common applications of BBS principles takes

the form of a behavioural safety trainingal observation and feedback process. In

this process, employees routinely observe one another, using a

brief checklist to guides their focus. After the observation, the

observer reviews his or her observations with the observee.

Positive feedback is given for safe behavioural safety trainings and corrective

feedback is given for any behavioural safety trainings thought to be at-risk. In

addition to the one-on-one discussion between the observer

and observee, the data from an entire group’s observations are

periodically compiled and analyzed to determine areas

warranting further attention.

While the immediate goal of a behavioural safety trainingal observation and

feedback process is to identify and increase critical safetyrelated behavioural safety trainings, the process, when done right, can achieve

much more. This process can be key to improving an

organization’s overall safety culture. For example, by

providing a structured approach to encourage systematic peer

observation and feedback, interpersonal feedback and problem

solving occurs more frequently on an informal basis. This

frequent informal communication between coworkers about

safety is critical to achieving a Total Safety Culture.

Therefore, how the process is designed and implemented

is critical. A more detailed description of the process itself, as

well as criteria for successful implementation, follows.

Process Design, Implementation, and Administration. A

cross-organizational Implementation Team (IT) comprised

primarily of production-level employees, but including

sufficient management representation, should be used to

oversee the design, implementation, and administration of the

process. This team should receive extensive training to allow

them to become the “in-house” experts in behavioural safety trainingal safety,

allowing them to design, and then administer an effective

process.

Developing the Checklist. The IT develops the initial

behavioural safety trainingal checklist by examining several information sources

such as injury and near miss reports, and job safety analyses.

The IT selects the top 3-10 categories of behavioural safety trainings they

believe to be most critical. Specific behavioural safety trainings are then listed

within each of the selected categories. For example, the

category of Body Position might include specific behavioural safety trainings

such as Lifting, Bending, and Twisting. The Team also

determines the demographic information to be included on the

checklist. Information such as Observer Name, Date, and

Department/Area are commonly used. Finally, the IT designs

the format of the checklist, depending upon their expectations

for how it will be used. It can be as small as a 3” x 5” index

card or as large as an 8.5” x 11” sheet of paper. See one

example of a behavioural safety trainingal checklist in Figure 2.

Developing the Process for Using the Checklist. Once the

checklist has been designed, the Implementation Team

develops guidelines for its use. The team determines who will

serve as observers and who will be observees. They suggest

how many observations should be conducted within an area by 4 M.R. GILMORE, S. R. PERDUE, AND P. WU SPE 74067

each team or employee, and how long the typical observation

should last. They determine where blank checklists may be

acquired, and where completed checklists may be deposited.

There are a myriad of possibilities for each of these

design criteria; there is no single best approach for all

organizations. The eventual success of the observation

process is contingent on these details being chosen to fit

within the nature of the work performed, but also the existing

culture of the organization.

Designing the Process for Analyzing the Data. Finally, the

IT determines how the data will be analyzed, how the

information will be shared, and how follow-up activities will

be initiated and completed. Systems should be developed to

ensure smooth operation of all of these functions.

Planning the Implementation. Once the process has been

designed by the Implementation Team, it should be carefully

introduced to the remaining workforce, management and

production-level employees alike. Thorough training on the

mechanics of the process, as well as the underlying principles

of behavioural safety trainingal psychology should be provided to all

participants and supporters. Employees at all levels of the

organization should understand their roles and responsibilities

in ensuring the process’ success. One of the primary roles of

production-level employees is to conduct observations and

give one another feedback.

Conducting the Observation. Before observing a coworker,

the observer is encouraged to ask the observee for permission

(see the Voluntary section for the rationale). If granted, the

observer watches the observee for a short period (typically 5 –

15 minutes). During the observation, the observer records

what he or she sees. For each safe behavioural safety training seen, the observer

makes a check mark in the Safe column; for each at-risk

behavioural safety training observed, a check mark is placed in the At-Risk

column. Behavioural safety trainings seen more than once would have the

corresponding number of check marks entered into that

particular category. Comments would also be added to clarify

anything seen by the observer, as well as serving as the

‘script’ for the observer’s feedback.

Giving Feedback. After the observation is complete, the

observer gives tactful, non-threatening feedback to the

observee. The observer provides praise for safe behavioural safety trainings and

corrective feedback for any at-risk behavioural safety trainings. The observer

should review the entire checklist with the observee, and

should ask open-ended questions to encourage a meaningful

dialogue between the observer and observee. Observee

comments should be added to the checklist where relevant.

Upon completion of the discussion, the checklist should be

deposited into a collection box to await pick-up by a member

of the Implementation Team.

The one-on-one feedback between peers following an

observation often informs the individual of a risky behavioural safety training he

or she was performing without realizing the risk. In other

cases, it provides social support by encouraging peers to take

the time and make the effort to perform a behavioural safety training safely

which s/he had chosen to perform unsafely. In these cases, the

feedback alone is often sufficient to allow the employee to

change their future behavioural safety training.

On-the-Spot Problem Solving. Often, however, feedback

alone is not sufficient to eliminate an at-risk work practice. In

many cases, at-risk behavioural safety trainings are encouraged or even required

by the work environment. For example, improper lifting

practices may be necessary because of the layout of a

particular workstation. Using a metal ladder for electrical

work may be facilitated if fiberglass ladders are needlessly

inconvenient to get. In these cases, changes to the work

environment should be made to reduce barriers to safe work.

Therefore, a critical component of an observation and

feedback process is for the observer and observee to analyze

the work situation and determine the contributing causes of

any at-risk behavioural safety trainings and define opportunities for

improvement. In some cases, immediate changes can be made

by the employees to reduce the likelihood of the behavioural safety training

being performed. In other cases, they would need to contact

the appropriate person(s) to facilitate the change.

Data Entry and Analysis. Data from the checklist is entered

into a database, usually by a member of the IT. The

summarized data are shared with all employees as a second

form of feedback, illustrating the areas in which the team is

excelling and those which provide the greatest potential for

improvement. Again, however, feedback alone may be

insufficient to realize optimal behavioural safety training change. Where the

compiled data reveal frequent occurrences of a particular atrisk behavioural safety training, there are likely system-level influences

affecting it.

Therefore, the Implementation Team analyzes the data

during their regular (e.g., monthly) meetings and implements

appropriate behavioural safety training-change interventions using a structured,

problem-solving methodology similar to that found in

continuous improvement approaches such as Total Quality

Management and Six Sigma. For example, if the data reveals

that a mechanical hoist is rarely used when needed, the Team

would examine the situation, determine why the hoist was not

being used, and introduce appropriate change(s). Perhaps the

hoist is inconveniently located or in constant use, in which

case relocating the hoist or the purchase of a second one may

be justified.

In some cases, the Implementation Team may determine

that a specific checklist is needed to focus improvement

efforts on a particular behavioural safety training (lifting), task (replacing a

pump), position (operators), or injury (burns).

Sustaining the Process. The observation and feedback

process should be evaluated regularly by internal and external

sources. Members of the IT should review their procedures

often and seek input from employees throughout the SPE 74067 BEHAVIOURAL SAFETY TRAINING-BASED SAFETY: THE NEXT STEP IN INJURY PREVENTION 5

organization for ways to improve the process. In addition, the

IT should consider having outside experts periodically

evaluate the observation process for improvement

opportunities. Finally, the IT should remain in regular contact

with teams from other organizations to benchmark their

respective progress.

Voluntary Participation. As implied earlier, there are

distinct benefits to making participation in the observation

process (as an observer and observee) voluntary. Before

someone is observed, they should grant their permission.

While this may seem puzzling at first, the advantages are

numerous. First, the process cannot be ‘employee-owned’ if

employees don’t have the chance to opt out. Second, it

expands the non-punitive message of the process: this is not a

spy program. The intention is to help people recognize risk,

perform the task more safely, and reveal and correct any

system-related influences on at-risk behavioural safety training. Third, voluntary

observations increase trust between the observer and the

observee. Anything more than casual observations of others

without their permission is an invasion of their personal

privacy. And fourth, gaining the observee’s permission makes

it easier to give him/her feedback, because he has given

consent. Without that permission, it would be easy for the

observee to ignore or mistrust the ‘unsolicited’ feedback.

Besides, observations resulting from ‘coerced’ participation

will likely be superficial at best, adding little or no value. And

such a situation will only serve to discourage employees from

ever genuinely participating in the future.

There may be some concern that the data resulting from

an observation may be invalid if the observee knows s/he is

being observed. Granted, the observee will attempt to perform

as safely as possible, many at-risk behavioural safety trainings are performed

subconsciously, such as placing a hand in a pinch point, or

lifting without using proper technique. If an individual isn’t

aware of an at-risk behavioural safety training, s/he can’t change the behavioural safety training

because they are being observed. And, after the novelty of the

process diminishes and employees begin to trust that it is not

punitive, they are much less likely to change their behavioural safety training

during an observation. As employees begin observing and

giving one another feedback as part of the formal process, the

conversation becomes comfortable. Eventually, employees

will find themselves informally observing and giving feedback

on a regular basis. Thus, the benefits gained from having both

observer and observee willingly participating far outweigh the

decrease in validity of the data.

Success Criteria

As mentioned before, the ability of an observation and

feedback process to truly impact the organization’s culture

depends on the details of how the process is designed and

implemented. There are several key characteristics of a

successful observation and feedback process:

• Customized

• Employee-owned

• Confidential

• Analymous

• Employees First

• Non-punitive

• Non-directive

• Dynamic.

Each is briefly explained.

Customized. The process must be adapted to the unique

needs of the organizational culture. This works best when the

BBS principles are well-understood and fitted to the culture,

as opposed to the culture being forced to fit the constraints of

a particular program. This customization can occur with

outside consultants helping the organization design the process

or with the consultants training organizational personnel to be

the ‘in-house experts’ who then can help design the process

with remaining sites, departments, or work teams.

Employee-owned. The observation and feedback process has

the best chance for long-term success if employees perceive

they actually own the process. This can best be accomplished

by giving employees a great deal of influence when the

process is selected, designed, and implemented. This typically

occurs when an Implementation Team comprised of mostly

production-level employees (with some management

representation) designs the process after appropriate education

and training, and with the support of individual(s) with

expertise in the area of behavioural safety trainingal safety.

Confidential. Employees will find it difficult to participate in

the observation process if they feel the observation data is not

confidential. With a guarantee of confidentiality, employees

will be more likely to agree to be observed, and be more likely

to perform their ‘normal’ behavioural safety trainings.

Anonymous. Similar in concept to the previous issue,

employees are more likely to support a process that doesn’t

include their individual name, allowing the data on a checklist

to be tracked back to them. Instead, data is typically tracked

by demographic information such as date, time, and/or area.

As employees become more comfortable with the process and

gain confidence that no one is being punished as a result of the

data, they will become far less anxious about having their

name on a checklist. In fact, many mature observation and

feedback processes include the name of the observee, with no

ill effect.

Employees first. Most observation process should start with

observations among production-level employees only.

Managers and supervisors are often asked not to participate as

observers during the first three to six months. As employees

become more comfortable participating in the process, they’ll

be more comfortable with their supervisors actively

participating.

Non-punitive. Punishment should never be an outcome of the

observation and feedback process. The sole outcome of an 6 M.R. GILMORE, S. R. PERDUE, AND P. WU SPE 74067

observation is to give and receive feedback, and to improve

any identified hazards. See the section on Discipline for a

more complete discussion of this issue.

Non-directive. The intent of the observation is not to have

the observer tell (or ‘direct’) the observee how to perform

their job, or even to ensure that s/he changes an at-risk

behavioural safety training. Instead, the feedback is intended to merely point

out any behavioural safety trainings that appear to place the observee at-risk, and

to discuss safer alternatives. It is then the choice of the

observee whether s/he changes the behavioural safety training in the future. The

process is not intended to put peers in the position to force one

another to change.

Average Reduction in Recordable Injury

Rates for SPS Clients Following

BBS Implementation

29%

50% 53%

65%

72%

79% 79%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7+

Figure 3: Graph shows the average percent reduction

in recordable injury rates in consecutive years after

implementation of SPS’ observation and feedback

process

Dynamic. The observation and feedback process should

remain dynamic, evolving and maturing to meet the needs of

the organization or team. The process may evolve by changing

the type or extent of checklists, changing the length or

frequency of observations, changing who observes, who is

observed, or who observes whom, and otherwise adapting the

process to meet the changing needs of the group.

Discipline and the Observation Process

Always an emotional topic, discipline becomes even more

relevant when discussed in light of a behavioural safety trainingal observation

and feedback process. The success of an observation and

feedback process relies on the support of the rank and file

employees. If people think discipline is a possible outcome of

the observation process, their participation isn’t likely, and

what little does occur, is likely to be artificial.

When contemplating the role of discipline, it is important

to remember that BBS processes are intended to focus on the

at-risk behavioural safety trainings in order to identify the root cause(s) that

influences the at-risk behavioural safety training; not to blame the employee. For

example, a maintenance worker observes a coworker

performing an at-risk behavioural safety training. During the ensuing discussion,

the influences on the at-risk behavioural safety training should come to light. For

example, the observee may reveal he never attended the

training class for this particular task, or he doesn’t have the

proper tool to perform the task safely, or he must bend in an

awkward position to reach the part, or he feels production

pressure and is rushing to finish the task quickly. Any number

of system influences may have accounted for the at-risk

behavioural safety training, and the observation tool helps identify them. Of

course, the observee may simply say he was distracted by

personal problems or that the safe behavioural safety training was too

inconvenient. In situations where there are no systemic

influences, the process is intended to use ‘positive peer

pressure’ to encourage individuals to perform the job safely.

There are two critical issues. First, observation data

cannot lead to any negative consequences. If an observer

reports a peer’s at-risk behavioural safety trainings to management or if a

member of management requests to see individual data from

somebody else’s observations, then large-scale participation is

not likely. Management should be able to view anonymous

group data, but should refrain from viewing a specific

individual’s data.

Second, if management participates as observers (and

there are pros and cons for either position), they should treat

the observation as a ‘no fear’ zone. In other words, if they see

the observee performing non-compliant behavioural safety training during the

observation, the management observer should stop the

observation, place the checklist in his or her pocket and coach

the employee. Outside these observations, the normal

organizational response by management is in effect. But

during the observation itself, employees must feel confident

they won’t be persecuted after volunteering to be observed.

Results

When designed and implemented correctly, behavioural safety training-based

observation and feedback can be very effective at helping the

organization reduce injuries and incidents. Figure 3 shows the

average percent reduction for a sample containing 34

organizations during consecutive years after the

implementation of an observation and feedback process.

Application of BBS Principles to Management

Systems

A behavioural safety trainingal observation and feedback process can be a very

effective means of reducing injuries and incidents in the

workplace and of affecting genuine change in an

organization’s safety culture. However, a behavioural safety trainingal

observation and feedback process is just one tool that applies

principles of psychology to encourage an improved safety

culture. In fact, without a positive (or improving) safety

culture, an observation and feedback process is likely to meet

limited success.

Organizations rely on a number of processes and

procedures to manage risk and thereby decrease the chance of

incidents and injuries. These generally include systems such

as safety rules and procedures, safety training, hazard

identification and correction, discipline, incident reporting and SPE 74067 BEHAVIOURAL SAFETY TRAINING-BASED SAFETY: THE NEXT STEP IN INJURY PREVENTION 7

analysis, safety communications, safety suggestions, group

celebrations, and rewards and recognition. Certainly, each of

these safety management systems has an important

contribution to make in terms of improving workplace safety.

Equally importantly, each system also influences the

organization’s safety culture. At best, when the system is

poorly designed or operating ineffectively, its benefits will be

lost. At worst, a poorly designed, badly implemented, or illfunctioning system can actually have a destructive influence

on the organization’s overall safety culture.

For example, in many organizations, reward or

reinforcement in the area of safety focuses on outcomes (i.e.,

injury rates) and avoiding failure. If employee incentive

programs and/or supervisor performance evaluations are based

primarily on injury rates, it is unreasonable to expect those

employees to embrace an open injury reporting system or to

feel comfortable being observed performing risky behavioural safety training

which may result in injury. A second system which is often

very telling of an organization’s culture is incident reporting

and investigation. The level of first aid cases and near miss

reporting is higher in organizations where employees share

trust and a problem-solving perspective. If incident reporting

is suppressed, investigations may be less than thorough,

communication of findings may be spotty, or discipline may

be feared.

Observation & Feedback

6.53 Alone is Often Not Enough

3.1 2.94

2.21

1.48

3.14

2.91

1.45

0.94

0 0

1.68

3.69

1.81

1.73

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01

Year

Recordable Rate

Observation & Feedback

Management

Systems Redesign

Figure 4: Graph shows the reduction in injury rates

after the implementation of an observation and

feedback process (1988) and an assessment and

redesign of other safety management systems (1996;

petrochemical plant of 350).

To further compound the situation, these systems are

interactive and, in many cases, overlap. For example, hazard

identification and correction requires an atmosphere fostering

employee participation, sufficient training so employees can

recognize and correct hazards, ample communication of the

hazard, and its sufficient resolution. Poor features of one

system may have negative influences on other systems,

making the problem areas more difficult to isolate and correct.

The same principles of psychology which underlie the

behavioural safety trainingal observation and feedback process are equally

applicable for creating other safety management systems

which motivate and reinforce safe work practices and create a

culture which promotes true interdependency for safety.

Therefore, the principles behind an effective observation

process should serve as a ruler against which to measure and

improve all organizational safety management systems. Then

they can be effective not only with regard to their primary

mission, but also have a positive influence on the

organization’s safety culture.

If an assessment of an organization’s existing safety

management systems shows deficiencies, two options should

be considered. First, consider the actual practices of the

company, department, or team to assess the strengths or

weaknesses. For example, safety training concerns may be

caused by a variety of issues, each with different solutions.

Safety training may be too short, too complicated, poorly

conducted, or too general for application on the job. Training

may be given by employees who lack credibility, or may be

conducted on required overtime either for the trainee or his

counterpart back on the job. The training itself may be top

notch but is treated by the employee’s supervisor as a nuisance

or as secondary to “getting the work done.” All these issues

and more may give training a bad reputation and, more

importantly, cause it to be ineffective at maintaining or

improving employee safety and health.

The second option is to analyze how perceptions of the

system are being managed (or not managed). For example, a

safety suggestion process may be seen as beneficial only by

those whose suggestions have been implemented or have

received feedback. Suggestions may be actively solicited,

objectively evaluated by a cross-functional team of

employees, amply funded, and quickly acted on but poorly

communicated to the rest of the workforce. Employees may

negatively evaluate this system, but the situation is addressed

easily without revising the entire safety suggestion system.

Organizations serious about changing their safety culture

should critically analyze each system to be certain it is aligned

with Total Safety Culture principles. Even when weaknesses

are identified, organizations should be cautious about

overhauling existing safety management systems too abruptly.

For example, employees accustomed to receiving “a payoff”

for working a certain length of time without an injury may be

resistant to a change in incentive programs. The redesign

process is not a quick one and some systems may transition

through several intermediate stages before they reflect

employee ownership, achievement orientation, or a systems

perspective.

Figure 4 shows a mature observation and feedback

process being helped by focusing on improving other safety

management systems. 8 M.R. GILMORE, S. R. PERDUE, AND P. WU SPE 74067

Social Psychology and BBS

In addition to the behavioural safety trainingal principles discussed here, there

are principles derived from social psychology that influence

behavioural safety training. Several are reviewed here—to be used not to

manipulate others, but to positively influence the safetyrelated behavioural safety trainings of others; to Actively Care for friends and

coworkers.

Consistency. When someone makes a decision, particularly if

they verbalize it to others, they tend to act in ways consistent

with that commitment. People don’t want to be seen as

‘inconsistent’ (or worse, ‘hypocritical’) by others. Not

adhering to a previous verbal commitment or exhibiting

behavioural safety training inconsistent with an opinion voiced earlier is

unappealing. Giving safety-related feedback to a peer, making

a public statement supporting safety efforts, or even receiving

sincere praise after safe behavioural safety training can all lead to increased

personal safety performance as individuals strive to conform

to their earlier decision (or live up to the expectations of

others).

Reciprocity. This principle is commonly understood as the

“you help me and I’ll help you” phenomenon. People feel

pressure to reciprocate someone’s treatment of them in the

same way and at the same level of intensity. Using a negative

example, if you insult someone or cause them grief, they’ll

feel the urge to ‘even the score’ by doing the same to you. On

a positive note, giving praise for safe behavioural safety training taps into this

strong desire by encouraging others to return the rewarding

feedback. Even if the object of someone’s feedback cannot

respond to them , he or she will feel an urge to provide

supporting feedback to someone else.

Conformity. Individuals tend to conform to the norm

expressed by the group’s majority. Those who go against the

grain invite the disapproval of the group. This principle is

even more effective if the group itself develops the

performance standard. If enough employees perform safety

behavioural safety trainings or actively care for their peers, others will feel

compelled to follow their example and conform to the new

standard.

Scarcity. People tend to desire things that are in short supply.

As availability or opportunity decreases for something

coveted, demand increases. If we can present opportunities to

participate in safety activities (e.g., joining safety teams,

conducting observations, revising a job safety analysis) as

being rare, limited, or special, we can potentially create

greater demand for participation.

Ingratiation. People tend to follow the advice or examples set

by people they like and respect, rather than those they dislike.

This doesn’t mean everyone should try to be everyone else’s

best friend, but it should influence how people interact with

others. Tactful, respectful, and non-threatening feedback will

leave the receiver with a favorable impression of the giver,

making it easier to comply with the safety feedback and

increasing the likelihood they’ll be open to feedback in the

futureSPE 74067 BEHAVIOURAL SAFETY TRAINING-BASED SAFETY: THE NEXT STEP IN INJURY PREVENTION 9